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  Emmanouil Aretoulakis
Abstract
There have been numerous critical articles on what really
happened on the otherwise beautiful morning of 11 September
2001. Beyond doubt, the bulk of the critical responses to the
terrorist attacks focused on the ethical and humanitarian, or
rather the unethical and inhumane implications of the atrocious
act, leaving no room for any philosophical reflection on the
potential assessment or reception of the event from the
perspective of art and aesthetics. The few years that have gone
by since 2001 have provided us with some a sense of emotional
detachment from the horror of that day, a detachment that may
have awakened our aesthetic and artistic instincts with regard to
the attacks themselves as well as their visual representation.
Chronological distance renders an unprejudiced and independent
stance more possible now than ever. It also allows us to
reconsider our initial politically correct and ethically justified
repulsion of the efforts made by a few artists to aestheticize
9/11. Such repulsion, however, was associated with the delusion
that by denouncing aesthetics we were really securing the
prevalence of politics, morality and ethical responsibility in a
terror-afflicted society. My point in this paper is that there is a
need for aesthetic appreciation when contemplating a violent
event such as the 9/11 terrorist attacks. What is more,
appreciation of the beautiful, even in case of a 9/11, seems
necessary because it is a key to establishing an ethical stance
towards terror, life, and art. It should be stressed that
independent aesthetic experience is not important in itself but is
a means of cultivating an authentic moral and ethical judgment.
Key Words
9/11, aesthetics, beauty, disinterestedness, ethics, Hirst, Kant,
moral judgment, politics, terrorism, terrorist attacks,
Stockhausen

1. The Exploration of the Impossible
A number of ambivalent statements were made by eminent
artistic figures in the aftermath of 9/11. Α year after the
destruction of the Twin Towers of the World Trade Center,
Damien Hirst, a contemporary artist from Britain, revealed that
he considered the September 11 terrorist attacks as a "visually
stunning artwork: The thing about 9/11," he told BBC News, "is
that it's kind of like an artwork in its own right. It was wicked,
but it was devised in this way for this kind of impact. It was
devised visually. . . . Of course, it's visually stunning and you've
got to hand it to them on some level because they've achieved
something which nobody would ever have thought possible. . . .
So on one level they kind of need congratulating, which a lot of
people shy away from, which is a very dangerous thing.[1]
This statement looks outrageous at first sight, to say the least.
To view this major terrifying incident as a visually stunning
achievement is dangerously close to prioritizing its supposed
aesthetic value as spectacle over its unquestionable social,
political and ethical dimensions. Hirst, however, is going beyond

merely expressing his repugnance by emphasizing the visual
potentials of such an event as a work of art. Not only that; he
wishes we could congratulate the perpetrators on their ability to
make possible an impossibility that, paradoxically, as I will
explain later, is an indispensable condition for great art's
existence, thus commenting not only on the tele-visual
representations of 9/11 but also on 9/11 itself as an artwork
whose inherent wickedness is integral to its supposed aesthetic
powerfulness or beauty. Is the artist then only interested in such
an atrocity as a work of art, a beautiful product? If so, where
does all the pain go? Could it be that Hirst's statement, far from
erasing pain, constitutes a different, other kind of ethical
appreciation that blends artistic pleasure with concern for real
pain, and human suffering with concern for aesthetic
appreciation? In other words, is a symbiosis of aesthetics and
ethics possible in the case at hand?
A week after the attacks, at a press conference for a series of
concerts featuring his music, the avant-garde German composer
Karlheinz Stockhausen "the greatest work of art ever. That
characters can bring about in one act what we in music cannot
dream of, that people practice madly for ten years, completely,
fanatically, for a concert and then die. That is the greatest work
of art for the whole cosmos. I could not do that. Against that,
we, composers, are nothing."[2] Right after these words were
blurted out, the composer's concerts were cancelled, as the
organizers were convinced that he was in favor of terrorism. It
never occurred to them that, like Hirst earlier on, Stockhausen
was bypassing the (discussion of the) unquestionably atrocious
consequences of the event, showing that he is fascinated or
mesmerized by its extremely violent, horrific characteristics, as
well as its occurrence as something inconceivable and impossible
even to reflect upon: "Artists, too, sometimes try to go beyond
the limits of what is feasible and conceivable, so that we wake
up, so that we open ourselves to another world."
The exploration of the impossible is, in the composer's view, a
defining principle of true art, thus when the impossible, "a jump
out of security, the everyday," becomes a reality, it constitutes
apparently the greatest work of the entire cosmos. Again, is
there any space left for the ethical element once aesthetic
appreciation of unprecedented atrocity comes into the picture?
The fervent reactions to Stockhausen's ideas insinuate that
artistic preoccupations with the humanely impossible as well as
the morally inconceivable have so far been unjustifiably (but not
unpredictably) overlooked as they belong to a future,
dispassionate, analysis of 9/11. Such an analysis would allow for
a morally free and thus more ethical explication, as it would
permit the symbiotic operation of many different faculties —
politics, aesthetics, ethics, realism, — without any of them ruling
over any other.[3]
My point in this paper is that there is a need for aesthetic
appreciation when contemplating a violent event such as the
9/11 terrorist attacks. What is more, appreciation of the
beautiful, even in case of a 9/11, seems necessary because it is
a key to establishing an ethical stance towards terror, life, and
art. It should be stressed that independent aesthetic experience
is not important in itself but as a means to cultivating an
authentic moral and ethical judgment.

We can get a glimpse of aesthetic appreciation as exemplified in
Hirst's and Stockhausen's thinking by resorting to the concept of
aesthetic or reflective judgment formulated by Immanuel Kant.
In the Introduction to The Critique of Judgment (1790), Kant
posits that there are two kinds of judgment, the determinant
and the reflective (or aesthetic), and that they are poles apart
from each other insofar as the former takes us from the
universal to the particular whereas the latter takes us from the
particular to the universal: "If that they are poles apart from
each other, insofar as the former takes us from the universal to
the particular whereas the latter takes us from the particular to
the universal: If the universal (the rule, principle, or law) is
given, then the judgment which subsumes the particular under it
is determinant. . . . If, however, only the particular is given and
the universal has to be found for it, then the judgment is simply
reflective."[4] Determinant judgment is based on a priori
conditions; therefore something beautiful is appreciated as such
in accordance with some laws that precede or preempt it.
Reflective or aesthetic judgment is based on a posteriori
assessment; therefore the beautiful is not a matter of prescribed
rules but of spontaneous subjective reaction. Aesthetic judgment
seems to be more autonomous and less prejudiced since it does
not apply ready-made rules to the object of beauty but rather
waits for the object to happen and then, after the fact, invents
the specific rules that will assess it as beautiful at that particular
moment. In other words, real beauty, according to Kant, may be
discerned through aesthetic judgment because this kind of
judgment remains unaffected by any mental preconceptions or
moral inhibitions carried by an individual prior to witnessing a
work of art.
Damian Hirst's description of the terrorist attacks as visually
stunning mostly bears on their representation or reproduction
via television, although it does contain an undertone of
admiration for the perpetrators because they allegedly
committed an act that far exceeded the artistically and socially
possible. Hirst seems to adopt the Kantian conception of
aesthetic/reflective judgment in appreciating the representation
of the 9/11 horrific deeds, as contrasted to those fiercely
criticizing him who assess the event from the perspective of
determinant judgment. The visually stunning artwork, as the
artist argues, is something that those responsible need to be
congratulated on since they have presumably gone where no
one has gone before in terms of artistic achievement. They have
committed an act transgressing the boundaries of the
commonplace and the possible; therefore they have
accomplished the true essence of beauty, as Kant defines it,
namely as an autonomous entity that defies human measure
and conceptual thinking.
But why does Hirst say that it is "a very dangerous thing" to shy
away from congratulating them? Why isn't his statement
dangerous, let alone flagrantly unjust or unethical towards the
victims of 9/11? In his view, it would be dangerous and wrong
to dwell too long on the immorality of aesthetic appreciation of
the entire event as something beautiful because to talk about
morality surrounding an event would shift attention away from
the event itself. From the point of view of art, to deal with
morality and representation in a single breath would probably
mean to judge on the basis of what happened before or after the
event. In other words, it would mean to assess, for instance, the

motives of the criminals and the consequences of their actions
only, instead of focusing with disinterestedness also on the thing
called 9/11 in itself as well as its visual representations, however
hard and insensitive that may be.
2. Moral Freedom in Relation to Art
Every time we look at the tele-visual representation of the
attacks on the World Trade Center, Hirst seems to say, we need
to take a minute and appreciate aesthetically the unprecedented
spectacle without worrying whether we are being immoral by
doing it. If we cannot do that, then we are allegedly both
morally unfree and prejudiced and, in the case of an artist, that
would be artistic suicide. Kant discusses the problem of moral
freedom in relation to beauty and art. He holds that the
beautiful is "an object of delight apart from any interest. . . .
For, since the delight is not based on any inclination of the
Subject, but the Subject feels himself completely free in respect
of the liking which he accords to the object, he can find as
reason for his delight no personal conditions . . . ."[5] Kant here
connects beauty with objectivity, universality of taste and, more
importantly, moral freedom, or rather freedom from morality (as
moralism). For him morality constitutes a problematic notion
when it comes to an individual's appreciation of an object to the
extent that it poses a question of interest or personal condition,
that is, a question of a deep-seated prejudice that blurs the
subject's view leading her or him to concentrate not on the
specific object of beauty but on all the things around that object.
That, however, represents an unethical stance to the extent that
it allows one to think of the object of beauty through the
perspective of determinant judgment only, which imposes
restrictions on individual taste, thus making human behavior
radically unfree. To put it in practical terms, if Kant were to
address the 9/11 terrorist acts, he would have regarded the
commonly accepted idea that terrorism is evil and immoral as
inevitably leading to the misconception that a visual
representation of terrorism is evil and immoral, too.
Hirst emphasizes the danger of dismissing art and aesthetic
appreciation for the sake of morality and argues that it would be
a shame to disregard the visual powerfulness of 9/11 just
because it appears morally wrong to deal with the disaster in
terms of anything else but the irreversible victimization of three
thousand people. These people, however, represent only a
horrifying consequence of the act and are absolutely irrelevant
to the act itself as a phenomenon and a visually defying event.
In Section Two of The Critique of Judgment Kant provides us
with the following example:
If any one asks me whether I consider that the
palace I see before me is beautiful I may, perhaps,
reply that I do not care for things of that sort that
are merely made to be gaped at. . . . All one wants
to know is whether the mere representation of the
object is to my liking, no matter how indifferent I
may be to the real existence of the object of this
representation. It is quite plain that in order to say
that the object is beautiful, and to show that I
have taste, everything turns on the meaning which
I can give to this representation, and not on any
factor which makes me dependent on the real

existence of the object. Everyone must allow that a
judgment of the beautiful which is tinged with the
slightest interest is very partial and not a pure
judgment of taste.[6]
To reply that one is not in the least interested in impressive or
beautiful things is a moral judgment and beside the point. In this
case, if one is uninterested in beauty alone one is surely far
from disinterested. A judgment about the purpose that, say, a
beautiful building fulfills, instead of tackling the building's pure
form, reveals a frame of thinking that is partial and dependent
upon subjective feelings or conceptual frameworks connected
with certain interests. If you are prejudiced against luxury, how
can you find a luxurious building beautiful, even if it really is? If
you tend to look down on the presence and the very nature of
an object, how can you really appreciate the representation of
it? Following a similar pattern, to insist that the air crash into
the WTC, as it was captured on television, was by no means a
mind-capturing or fascinating view because so many human
lives were terribly lost is probably to miss the point of
fascination as an ineffably disinterested act of appreciating
beauty. Of course, it does matter a lot that there were
thousands of victims and one could not think of a more brutal,
infinitely inhumane and immoral act of violence, but there still
remains the question of (not) letting interest interfere with the
autonomy of aesthetic powerfulness, in this case, the sheer
visual event of the attack. Interest would definitely be extremely
confusing in the sense that psychological, moral, emotional
involvement, albeit perfectly natural, would affect our judgment
and lead us to think that a terrorist act that led to the death of
so many people can never be called visually compelling or
fascinating.
Kant draws our attention to the fact that there is a deep
heterogeneity between visual compulsion, which is interest-free,
and reason or morality. Whereas reason has to do with the
common laws of understanding that are based on predetermined
rules of the should/should not type, visual attraction, because
springing directly from human emotion and imagination, bears
on more authentic rules grounded on an aesthetic/reflective and
independent judgment that judges what it sees at any given
moment rather than stops to think rationally before judging.
Kant describes the aesthetic idea as "an inexponible
representation of the imagination," and the rational idea as "an
indemonstrable concept of reason."[7] Elsewhere he says that
the aesthetic idea is "the counterpart (pendant) of a rational
idea," meaning that beauty does not pertain to the realm of
reason; in a sense it is other than reason.[8] Thus, on the one
hand, when we watch a disaster happen live in front of our eyes
or through endless re-runs on our television screens, reason
dictates that we feel for the victims, even if we or our own are
not directly involved in the tragedy, while raging against those
who provoked it. It is the natural thing to do. On the other hand,
we are unknowingly captivated by an ineffable and forbidden
feeling of awe and secret pleasure that we've finally gotten the
chance to witness something unprecedented: the terrifying but
compelling dimensions of Kantian beauty. And that is neither
natural nor reasonable. It signifies, rather, the emergence of the
aesthetic deprived of logic or morality.
3. Politics, Ethics and Aesthetic Appreciation

The aesthetic is the key to thinking of the 9/11 disaster as
visually captivating or stunning. A passenger plane literally
crashing into a WTC skyscraper is something we have never
witnessed before. Therefore we cannot associate it with an
already established law of reasoning so as to be able to
conceptualize it. Its aesthetic power derives from its autonomy,
its non-dependence on any known category of perception. The
WTC, argues Frank Lentricchia, has been transformed "into a
narrative of spectacular images. Terrorism for the camera." This
is our fascination."[9] We are fascinated by the spectacular as
an original personal experience, thereby leading ourselves, as
spectators, automatically into the terrain of aesthetic
appreciation, namely of what is new, previously unknown and,
yes, for a single moment, beautiful to us.
In an intriguing article, Ronald Bleiker points out that "the
sensibility that aesthetic insight may generate, and that
instrumental reason is unable to apprehend, also includes the
unknown, the unseen, and the unthought. For Walter Benjamin,
this is the very task of art: to generate a demand for which a
sense of need has not yet arisen."[10] Instrumental reason, that
is, cannot comprehend the importance that individual taste
places on the spectacular or the unknown, and that is why it
excludes the aesthetic, as aesthesis or sensibility, from the
entire problematic of, for instance, realist politics in relation to
terrorism. Bleiker aims to show how closely interrelated reason
and the commonplace really are, hence, the non-spectacular
and the known, and how limited reason's scope really is insofar
as it attempts to conceive of both life and art through already
established laws and common thought patterns.
The problem, however, lies in the fact that true aesthetic
experience, artistic originality, and the beauty of unprecedented
spectacularity are autonomous because, by definition, they are
not contingent upon the sphere of what Kant calls concept or the
commonplace. If they were, they would not be original,
spectacular, or an experience. Kant always thought the beautiful
to be an object that is radically other than reason or
concept.[11] A characteristic example that encapsulates his
theory of the beautiful as an object that we may see but may not
touch is the one referring to art's inability to explain itself:
"[N]no Homer or Wieland can show how his ideas . . . enter and
assemble themselves in his brain, for the good reason that he
does not himself know, and so cannot teach others."[12] The
artist does have a vague idea about the thing that s/he says,
but absolutely no clue how that thing came about. If s/he had
some idea, it would mean that her or his work corresponded to
certain needs of a given reality, which, in turn, would render the
art predictable and its beauty unoriginal. If we are to subscribe
to Benjamin's view that art's mission is to create demands
where there are no needs, we have to accept that (beautiful) art
is in excess of established reality, simultaneously generating, in
a way, an excess of reality. To put it in plain terms, true art
posits issues that will only be dealt with or appreciated in the
future. In this light, what comments like Damian Hirst's
contribute today is a platform for tomorrow's artistic as well as
political needs.
Aesthetic appreciation and art become imperative when it comes
to addressing terrorism. Looking at terror through the lens of
aesthesis by no means undermines the seriousness of a critical

political situation. Far from it; it yields alternative or additional
insights into a terrorist incident that reason, alone, cannot
account for and helps retain an ethical and political stance
towards terrorism. Those insights have to do with the power of
imagination, sensibility, and "a range of other, more sensuous
and perhaps more tangible yet equally important forms of
insights, from the poetic to the purely visual."[13] For example,
the filmic reproduction of the September 11 attacks, if looked at
with a disinterested and not morally involved eye, may be
imprinted on the mind in such a way that it allows us to
contemplate the event by using alternately imagination and
reason, sensibility and logic, and fantasy and memory, without
privileging specifically one single faculty. Moreover, in order to
continue to do justice to the horrific dimensions of this event, it
does not suffice to simply use written or spoken language to
convey what happened on that day.[14] To lay bare the political
and social consequences, continuous exposure to, and aesthetic
appreciation of the event, its visual representations are
necessary not only because the category of the visual is more
intense, being much more of a palpable experience, but also
because it will help preserve the memory throughout the ages
and generations to come, thereby keeping options open as to
how such an event should be treated politically.
Aesthetic judgment, as Kant views it, is much more related to
politics and ethics than we think. "Art's vivid symbolization of
autonomy, despite its unrestrained incomprehensibility,
represents the single most powerful motivation for Kant's writing
of the third Critique," writes Tobin Siebers, adding that "Kant's
insistence . . . that the beautiful object possesses a perceptible
form requires that it exist on a scale approachable by human
beings, and this means that his view of otherness has inherent
political value."[15] Not only does the beautiful object have a
perceptible form that shows its compatibility with the human
and the political, but also its inherent autonomy is a symbol of
moral freedom, individual autonomy and humanity's urge to
extricate itself from prejudice and traditional morality. As we
have already seen, both aesthetic appreciation of beauty and
reflective judgment emphasize the role of disinterestedness in
assessing an object. In effect, not only pure and humane (or
good) but also ugly or inhumane works of art may be seen as
aesthetically beautiful because art is not obliged to always make
us feel good. Damian Hirst's acceptance of art's detachment
from the morality-immorality binary leads him to state that all
the inhumanity and violence encompassing the site of the crash,
the so-called "Ground Zero," by no means rule out the possibility
of the emergence of art. On the contrary, in this specific case
they foreshadow the advent of original art in the form of the
ugly and the immoral: It was wicked, but it was devised in this
way for this kind of impact.
Artistic representation and the subsequent aesthetic appreciation
of ugliness and inhumanity potentially promote the political and
consolidate an ethically responsible attitude towards history and
the nations. Eugene Delacroix' magnificent 1824 painting
Massacre at Chios depicts how 20,000 Greeks were butchered by
the Turks on the island of Chios in two days. The massacre had
taken place only two years before, so it was a very recent
incident. Delacroix's use of vivid colors, fervent passion and
strong emotion managed to convey accurately the terror on
people's faces as well as the ruthlessness of the enemy, thus

helping shift the attention of the European powers to the Greek
cause. We might say that the painting, which was bought by the
French Government for 6,000 francs, constituted an immediate
political statement by spreading the word of the Greek
revolution, aside from the fact that it handed down to the next
generations the knowledge and awareness of a gory event. Of
course, the Massacre at Chios is a work of art while the WTC
terrorist attacks footage is not. Still, in both cases real people
and real horror are involved. In both instances there are
spectators called upon to appreciate the representation of an
atrocious event by judging critically the autonomous form of the
event, therefore resorting to aesthetics and visual powerfulness
for making a political inference.[16]
I need to emphasize here that I have no intention whatsoever of
equating the very real atrocity of the terrorist disaster with the
artistic representation of a terrorizing incident from the distant
past. After all, there was no literal violence involved in the
making of the painting, as contrasted to the 9/11 footage which
was a direct reporting rather than an artistic representation of
an unspeakable atrocity. On the other hand, the Massacre at
Chios is quite possibly a direct reporting of atrocity, too. It
would be wrong to overlook the potential truthfulness and/or
historical accuracy of Delacroix's work if we are to take into
consideration that, in Delacroix's time, there was no
photography or camera that would provide a perfect
reproduction of an event. Painting did play the role of a camera;
or better, painting constituted a primitive kind of photography.
The artistic representation of the Chios incident is much closer to
reality than we think. Both appraise Delacroix's quasiphotographic illustration and adopt the ethically right and moralfree attitude towards images of 9/11 one needs to
simultaneously activate one's sensual and intellectual capabilities
in order to grasp the political as well as ethical dimensions of the
aesthetically powerful, because the object of "beauty" "is both a
source of intimate, personal feelings and of an idea of reason
present in every human being."[17]
Terrorism cannot and should not be seen as a work of art. It is
true that many times we consider a non-art object as if it were
artistic in order to discuss its aesthetic value or dimensions.
However, something could be visually stunning or aesthetically
powerful without being considered a work of art. The important
thing is to retrieve the aesthetic quality or aspect of a serious
event in order to reveal or, even better, to sense its moral
consequences and its ethical and social impact on human
psychology and political practice. The September 11 attack,
without being itself art, should be seen primarily as an aesthetic
experience that we have to dwell on so that we will never risk
rationalizing atrocity.
Terrorism is not art, "though the parallels between them are
close enough to be disturbing, given" that "after certain acts of
terrorism, we are often told, the world will never be the same
again. An impact of such magnitude is analogous to the lasting
effect of great art," argues Simon Caterson.[18] And while if
Hirst is justified, though not unconditionally, for his idea that the
images from the 9/11 terrorist attack footage, but not the event
itself, resemble works of art, Stockhausen, who was nearly
lynched for declaring his admiration for the terrorists themselves
as artists and the 9/11 atrocity as "the greatest work of art

ever," moves from the representation of the event to the event
itself as some, perhaps morbid, kind of art. In Stockhausen
astonishing view, the main reason why 9/11 is a crime is that
"the people were not agreed. They didn't go to the
'concert.'"[19] The underlying assumption here is that the
terrorist attack is, still, a concert, a work of art, regardless of
whether the victims were agreed or not. What for Stockhausen
gives the event its artistic flavor, though, is supposedly the fact
that the jump out of security and the everyday, which, according
to the composer, happens sometimes poco a poco in art, took
place in a single instant in the case at hand, thus turning 9/11
into a grand scale impromptu symphony, the most magnificent
art of the whole cosmos.
4. Stockhausen's Romantic Vision: Authenticity and
Terrorism
So many years later it remains extremely hard to conceive, let
alone accept, Stockhausen's opinion. However, it would be very
useful to see why and how he has come to believe 9/11 to be an
artistic phenomenon, which would subsequently lead us to
unearth ethical or unethical traces in artistic thought and
eventually draw our own conclusions as to the contiguity of
terror and art and, more importantly, of terrorism and aesthetic
experience. Like Hirst, Stockhausen advocates the
disengagement of art from conventional morality and the a priori
laws of reason that hinder an unprejudiced view of autonomous
beauty. Instead, he celebrates the potentialities of an
aesthetic/reflective judgment that respects the visually powerful
object (the object of beauty) for what it is, namely, an
incomprehensible otherness independent of pre-given concepts,
rather than preempting visual power (or the object-hood of
beauty) on the basis of the morality-immorality or conceptimagination binary.
In terms of his particular philosophical viewpoint, it is more than
clear that Stockhausen subscribes to a religious concept of art.
If art is not related to some kind of revelation that involves life
and death, an apocalyptic vision of creation that involves a
reconfiguration of human consciousness, indeed, of reality itself,
then it is worth nothing. Seen that way, true art treads on
forbidden ground where it mingles with reality without being
reality's mirror image, that is, a sheer representation of reality
any longer. The true target of art, Stockhausen would insist, is
to authenticate itself by becoming real, tangible, abandoning the
sphere of the false and the artificial forever. In this light, the
apocalyptic and aesthetically powerful nature of the 9/11 strikes
consists in the fact that the terrorists attained the unattainable,
achieved something in one act by eccentrically opting for a hit
that was unprecedented and original, and spectacular and
inconceivable at the same time, since nobody thought that such
a hit was feasible on American territory.
However paradoxical it may sound, Stockhausen's artistic vision
is imbued with the romantic spirit and its pervasively anarchist
aesthetic. It is romantic because it is aligned with the persistent
romantic quest for authenticity and the innovative. It is
anarchist because it transgresses the commonly acceptable
model of order and harmony, also introducing the destructive
presence of evil embodied in the figure of Lucifer. Creation's
counterpart is destruction, and art needs to bear witness to

that; otherwise art functions as propaganda in favor of purity
and morality. A few days after his initial statement about 9/11
being a great work of art, Stockhausen attempted to clarify his
ideas by issuing another statement bringing up the question of
Satan:
In my work, I have defined Lucifer as the cosmic
spirit of rebellion, of anarchy. He uses his high
degree of intelligence to destroy creation. He does
not know love. After further questions about the
events of America, I said that such a plan appeared
to be Lucifer's greatest work of art. Of course, I
used the designation "work of art" to mean the
work of destruction personified in Lucifer. . . . I
cannot find a fitting name for such a "satanic
composition."[20]
In other words, the terrorist attacks were a work of art not for
Stockhausen but for Lucifer who, being a basic character in the
composer's project over a period of twenty-five years, plays the
role of a dark power speaking through him but definitely not on
his behalf. Lucifer, whose productive spirit could not be anything
but destructive, represents anarchy, which is just as important
for artistic creativity as is order and harmony.[21] Stockhausen
wants to appear only as the disinterested and unprejudiced
bearer of a message according to which art expresses rebellion
as well as social harmony, ugliness as well as beauty, and
inhumanity as well as humanity. He passes no judgment, and if
he does, he judges aesthetically by reflecting on the thing-initself as the object of appreciation.
The question of authenticity, which is the second issue raised by
Stockhausen, pervades the entire problematic of art and the
aesthetically powerful in relation to violence and terror. As
already implied, art is really art when, paradoxically, it stops
being art and connects itself more and more with actual life.
Art's self-authenticating mechanism of entering reality erases
art's fictional character by giving it the opportunity to assume
the role and significance of some natural presence acting in the
world rather than an artificial representation that simply
articulates what is already there. To put it differently, far from
articulating the need of personal expression on the artistic level,
art becomes fully politicized as an agency that acts on its own in
the social sphere, thus enabling it to interact with and affect the
world directly. The inconceivable and unimaginable crash into the
WTC in New York might be imagination's atrocious way of
revealing to us sarcastically, "There is more to me than meets
your eye!" It's as if deadly art all of a sudden exercised its
destructive, dehumanizing power over society and everyday life,
exhibiting an utterly alienating face that transgressed the
traditional boundary of art as we know it, namely the category
of the aesthetic, expanding to the field of the political. The
assumption of a more active role by art is put eloquently by
another critic: "If we do not merely settle into thinking of art as
personal expression within the canonically bounded domain of
the aesthetic, and we ascribe to art an active involvement . . .
then we better be ready to come to terms with art as a realm in
which humanity exercises its utmost creative/destructive
potential, and not in the so-called (since Hegel) world of the
spirit but in the world itself."[22]

From the above, we may infer that those artists who think of the
September 11 attacks as a great work of art are not necessarily
unfeeling or emotionally crippled persons. Artists like
Stockhausen and Hirst strive to attain absolute beauty in their
works by attempting to reach out to the truly authentic, which
only materializes when art exceeds its artificial status and starts
to affect reality. One might say that an art that claims to such a
version of authenticity is an art that functions like a terrorist for
humanity and creativity, insofar as it ruthlessly violates the law
that dictates that art remain a representation. On an artistic
level, Stockhausen seems envious (!) of the 9/11 terrorists
because apparently, however outrageous that sounds, they
unknowingly managed to create the greatest work of art in just
one act by proving that art is presence rather than
representation and, in addition, by creating something new out
of ordinary material. For instance, the weapons they used,
planes, an apotheosis of technology and materiality, do belong
to the realm of the everyday (they fly over our heads all the
time). Still, we cannot turn a blind eye to the extraordinary
effect the terrorists made out of such ordinariness. Stockhausen,
by contrast, allegedly never achieved the extraordinary by
getting out of the normal human cycles or attaining the
absolutely unfamiliar, the one thing that the world has never
witnessed before or the music that has never been heard.
To play the music that has never been played before,
Stockhausen's greatest desire, and thereby creating
unprecedented aesthetic power, one needs to be capable of recreating or reforming consciousness, and that is exactly what the
terrorists did. They became part of a huge artistic project that
was to be performed once by people about to die precisely
because of that project. The uncanny (but horrendous)
powerfulness of the project is attributable to its instantaneous
completion and the termination of everyone involved in it,
including the innocent victims. At issue is "the one composition
that would signify in all senses the end of composition "because
it would exceed all possible points of reception and
interpretation, including the point of its creation."[23] Art
imbued with such finality relies upon Lucifer for reinforcing its
transformative power, even though it knows that Lucifer's
destructiveness is very likely to bring its kingdom (art's
kingdom) to an end by transforming it into crude and perilous
reality.
5. The Familiar and the Unfamiliar
Borrowing a tone of frivolity, we might liken art to an air-born
mass (planes?) attacking reality (the Twin Towers?) in a suicidal
mood, thus producing a gruesome excess of it (reality) that is
subsequently disseminated in an artistic fashion through
television, dramatization, narrative, witness accounts, etc. By
attacking reality, art becomes reality, but the intriguing part
herein is that the exact point of art's transformation into reality
is the point at which authentic beauty, or rather the
attractiveness of the authentic, rises in the form of the one and
only terrorizing act during which, as already said, ordinariness is
exceeded and the familiar is transformed into something
unfamiliar.
In The Critique of Judgment Kant exemplifies authentic beauty
by connecting it with an oscillation between familiarity and

unfamiliarity:
[W]ild, and in its appearance quite irregular beauty,
is only pleasing as a change to one whose eyes
have become surfeited with regular beauty. . . .
[B]eautiful objects have to be distinguished from
beautiful views of objects. . . . In the latter case
taste appears to fasten, not so much on what the
imagination grasps in this field, as on the incentive
it receives to indulge in poetic fiction, i.e. in the
peculiar fancies with which the mind entertains
itself as it is being continually stirred by the variety
that strikes the eye. It is just as when we watch the
changing shapes of the fire or of a rippling brook:
neither of which is a thing of beauty, but they
convey a charm to the imagination because they
sustain its free play.[24]
A brook does not strike the eye as something impressive but a
rippling brook does spark the imagination because it sustains its
free play. It might be argued that the former embodies a regular
beauty while the latter an irregular one, given that the mind is
in this case stirred by the variety and movement of the brook's
ripples. According to Kant, people are quite familiar with regular
beauty, and this familiarity leads them to appreciate it much
less, having grown tired of it. On the other hand, irregular
beauty is rather unfamiliar to them; therefore it is experienced
as something that is inherently beautiful because it is original,
an authentic experience of newness. How is such an experience
of newness attained in the case of the September 11 attacks? A
passenger jet is considered a state-of-the-art technological
achievement but it does not look different from hundreds of
other aircraft screaming across the horizon every day. It
constitutes a beauty, but only a regular one insofar as we are far
too familiar with images of it to find it striking. However, the
impossible view of such a jet swooping in on the Twin Towers
that stand in themselves for regular beauty, too, creates an
effect of defamiliarization because, to put it in simplistic terms,
we have hardly watched a big plane attack a well-known
building.[25]
In essence, defamiliarization derives from the fact that although
the protagonists of the episode are well-known and thus
ordinary (who doesn't know what an airplane looks like or what
the World Trade Center is?), the overall effect evoked in the
minds of the spectators is unprecedented and extraordinary: two
familiar objects combine in an unfamiliar mode thereby yielding
an authentic experience of newness, an irregular beauty, as Kant
envisions it. Stockhausen's and Hirst's admiration derives partly
from the realization of the oscillation between the familiar and
the unfamiliar in the Twin Towers crash. The transition from
familiarity to unfamiliarity and back conveys a charm to the
imagination to the extent that the imagination receives the
incentive to indulge in poetic fiction, stirred by fiction, stirred by
the variety that strikes the eye.
Such an authentic experience of newness is not disconnected
from real life, inhumanity, and horror. In a provocative article
Frank Lentricchia maintains that "aesthetic revolutionaries over
the past two centuries wage polemical war on behalf of the
authentic, which they habitually define as an overcoming of

precisely traditional art's 'once removed' character," adding that
Wordsworth's intention to use language that was really spoken
by ordinary men was not so innocent after all, since what he
aspired to was not the successful conveyance of poetic feeling
but, rather, the erasure of the distinction between word and
thing; in other words, the erasure of the mediated character of
poetry, and by extension, of art.[26] Unfortunately, to erase the
mediated character of poetic language is also to come face-toface with inhumanity and horror owing to the fact that language,
and art, is then deprived of its metaphorical and symbolic
characteristics, thus resorting to crude and dangerous literality.
Still, that is probably a risk we should take if, following the
Kantian model, we are to view art and aesthetic experience in a
serious and ethical way, that is, with a disinterested and
unprejudiced eye that allows for the emergence of all sides of
art, legitimate or illegitimate, humane or dehumanizing.
"To consider the merits of [Stockhausen's idea of the aesthetic
character of the extremely violent event called '9/11'] would
require that we put aside the virtually unavoidable sentimentality
that asks us to believe that art is always somehow humane and
humanizing; that artists, however indecent they might be as
human beings, become noble when they make art. . . ."[27] In
Sex, Literature, and Censorship, Jonathan Dollimore supports
the following:
To take art seriously must be to recognize that its
dangerous insights and painful beauty often derive
from tendencies both disreputable and deeply antisocial. We know that the aesthetic vision has the
power to threaten reactionary social agendas. . . .
But art can also seduce us into attitudes which
threaten progressive, and humanely responsible,
social agendas as well. . . . Lovers of art have
promulgated well-intentioned lies: they tell us that
great art and the high culture it serves can only
enhance the lives of those who truly appreciate it;
that such art . . . is incapable of damaging or
'corrupting' us.[28]
In essence, what both Dollimore and Lentricchia are telling us
here is that, at times, literature and art, far from confirming
human values, actually oppose them. Seen in this way, art is not
a utopia of good and pure intentions separated from the
murkiness of the outside world. It is rather a realm where
multiple creative and destructive forces operate beyond good
and evil at the level of the aesthetic. To adopt an ethical stance
towards art we have to acquiesce in the fact that serious art
produces pleasure as well as pain, and Dollimore's notion of
painful beauty as deriving from anti-social tendencies is perfectly
aligned with both Hirst's and Stockhausen's reception of the
9/11 attacks as something painful but aesthetically
powerful.[29]
In Hirst's view, there was something utterly surreal about
turning a passenger plane into a weapon of destruction, while
watching people jump off the Twin Towers was a completely
unreal spectacle that he, along with other artists, could not but
see in an artistic way as an unprecedented and therefore highly
authentic moment that only the category of the aesthetic can
truly appreciate. "I remember seeing people jumping out the

buildings holding hands. The whole thing was completely
unreal."[30] In Stockhausen's view, the artistic dimension of the
atrocity can be put down to the fact that the unreal became, in a
single instant, real since artistic representation merged into real
presence as art uncovered the aesthetic and creative potential of
crude reality. An infinitely unrealistic (because beyond any
imagination) murderous artwork was transformed into a fully
realistic entity, given that art's poco a poco leaps out of security
occurred, in the case of the terrorist attacks, on a massive scale.
6. Terrorism, Performance, and its Audience
Nobody could seriously have taken pleasure in an act involving
the killing of three thousand people. Nonetheless, from an
artistic point of view it is conceivable that one may have secretly
been enticed by a perfectly orchestrated hit or performance
pulled off successfully without a single "rehearsal." Marvin
Carlson, in Performance, maintains that performance requires
"the physical presence of trained or skilled human beings whose
demonstration of their skills is the performance."[31] The
terrorists, indeed, demonstrated their special skills in public, in
front of a horrified and speechless nation-audience watching
them perform multiple hits at two major symbols of Western
power: the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. The attacks
constituted a performance insofar as there were people to attend
them, either in person or through their TV sets. The media
played a very important role in the mounting of the
performance, as they helped disseminate the unprecedented
images of the hits and thus intensify their impact on the global
community: As two critics very eloquently put it, "the news
media, the terrorism specialists, and the terrorists themselves
require one another in order to thrive.[32]
If the attacks are a performance, is it what Kant would call a
beautiful one? Stockhausen presents himself as an admirer of
the terrorists' professional efficiency rather than a lover of their
horrific deeds. Their atrocious attack (performance) took place in
the presence of three thousand unsuspicious minds having a
tragically active role in it and was witnessed by millions of others
around the world. So technically speaking, it proved a huge
success as spectacle. For Hirst and Stockhausen it constituted
an out-of-this-world project that beat art at its own game by
setting new boundaries for reality and broadening the horizons
of conventional art. The project looked aesthetically powerful to
them insofar as it single-handedly took reality to an other place
where art supposedly hasn't reached yet: the place of the
inconceivable. Beauty in that other place is so insidious that it
creeps unconsciously into a number of 9/11 horror narratives
initially meant to convey the ugliness of the event.
One critic, for example, has associated the 9/11 images with the
chaotic but aesthetically overwhelming paintings of Hieronymus
Bosch:
Images of just punishment, of hell and damnation,
are deep and recurrent themes in the Western
imagination, and images of the New York City crash
site were framed by aesthetic archetypes of
apocalypse that recalled the late medieval paintings
of Hieronymus Bosch. Dust blotted out the sun. Day
turned to night. People caught on fire, suffocated,
and jumped to their death. Hysteria and wild

screaming were recorded . . . and policemen were
brought to their knees, and they died in abject
confusion. . . . In the towers above, rich and
powerful men and women . . . their sophisticated
machines useless, and they died in even greater
numbers."[33]
In this account, aesthetic judgment/appreciation proves an ally
in representing adequately the atrocity of the attacks and their
immediate effects. The narrator resorts to a quasi-literary
description to talk about the excruciating moments of real pain
and death as he envisaged or saw them on the TV. It is not only
the 9/11 footage as such that evokes images of an apocalyptic
vision of art; the critical reception of the footage, too, emerges
virtually as an artistic creation assuming the form of a beautiful
literary narrative of panic and real horror. Simultaneously, such
narrating constitutes a moral act if we take moral to mean doing
justice to the atrocity in its full dimensions.
The aesthetic of beauty naturally materializes also in terrorist
mentality. If a 9/11 terrorist could read one of the
aforementioned apocalyptic reports on the WTC attacks, he
would certainly be exhilarated not only by the psychological
impact of the attacks but also by their association with the
ultimate Biblical signifier: Judgment Day. Aside from the obvious
implications regarding the alleged death of the Christian world,
such an association, from a terrorist point of view, would signify
the tangible fulfillment of a crazy and forbidden fantasy, namely
the destruction and humiliation of a Satanic absolute (Western)
power. The perfect harmonization of the concept of absolute
terrorism with its actualization and practical exertion on two
major symbols of Western capitalism encapsulates terrorist
beauty, or beauty in all its terrifying magnificence.
In The Critique of Pure Reason (1781) Kant says that the image
is never fully congruent with a concept, maintaining that an idea
denotes a totality which can never be given in concreto. As he
argues, " . . . any knowledge which we can acquire still leaves
us in complete uncertainty as to what should be ascribed to the
object, and that while we do indeed have a concept sufficient to
raise a question, we are entirely lacking in materials or power to
answer the same."[34] In short, there is concept but there is no
adequate imaginative repository that can do justice to a
concept. Still, a momentary concretization of a concept is, I
believe, at stake. What if Imagination and Reason (or concept)
could be reconciled, the former being able to present accurately
the totality of the latter? If that were the case, the Kantian
beautiful( in its ancient Greek sense as eumorfos (εύμορφος)
and in its modern Greek sense as omorfos (όμορφος), that
which has an enticingly harmonious form (morfi) ) would result
from conceiving in imaginative terms, the inconceivable in terms
of reason or concept.
Aesthetic judgment, for Kant, involves the harmonization of the
faculties of imagination and understanding. In addition, aesthetic
pleasure accompanies the common apprehension of an object by
the imagination, as the faculty of intuition, in relation to the
understanding, as the faculty of concepts. . . ."[35] In effect, to
conceive the inconceivable would mean to bridge the gap
between the absolute and the mundane, thus letting pure form
emerge as the resolution of the aforementioned heterogeneity

between image and totality. When Damian Hirst calls the 9/11
disaster visually stunning, he implies that the gap between
(terrorist) conception and (terrorist) implementation was
bridged, and wonders whether art could ever do the same, for
instance, by uniting the ideal and the feasible. In the context of
the WTC attacks, absolute aesthetic power or form was
experienced as absolute terror realized on a practical, that is,
mundane, level.
If the September 11 terrorists theoretically conceived of an
inconceivable attack and subsequently made it happen, thereby
satisfying (unknowingly?) the principle of beauty in the form of
an unimaginable fantasy, ordinary citizens and viewers of the
terrorist hit satisfied this principle, too, simply by watching live
an unprecedented event which they had somehow conceived of
or fantasized about many times in the past, bringing to a
consensus, in a way, the idea of the ultimate disaster and its
practical examples in real life.
But how did an innocent audience fantasize about an absolute
disaster? Let us make clear that fantasize here does not mean
"wish for" but rather "look into the possibility of." How, then, do
ordinary people look into the possibility of absolute terror? There
have been innumerable Hollywood films of catastrophe with
apocalyptic and post-apocalyptic scenarios. As spectators, we
have become so tragically accustomed to viewing wellorchestrated, albeit fictitious catastrophes on the artistic level on
TV or cinema representations that we could almost admit to
ourselves that we would die to witness a cinematic catastrophe
in real life. Sadly, we are too deeply immersed into the culture of
visual violence not to appreciate aesthetically, or take secret
pleasure in, real violence when it occurs.
Thus, if there lies a Kantian purposiveness in the form or image
of two planes crashing into the WTC; if, that is, our idea of
beauty is defined by a predetermined taste in viewing
spectacular disasters, and we also have the feeling that as
spectators we have earned the right to witness catastrophes of
this magnitude, then there is a covert selfish feeling of
satisfaction whenever we do witness them. The reason is that
unconsciously we come really close to erasing the gap between
art and reality by reserving for the former some of the latter's
space and vice versa, eventually blurring the boundary between
reality and fiction. In Kant's terms, absolute Terror is the
concept that has found a way to talk about itself through
Imagination (the images and horror of 9/11). Such a consensus
of imagination and concept might lead to what Kant calls
beautiful, which is precisely what artists like Hirst and
Stockhausen allude to when referring to the aesthetic nature of
the terrorist atrocity.
I do not wish to make a political statement here in connection
with the reception of the September 11 attacks, although I can't
overlook the fact that critics have often argued that people's
fantasy about the destruction of a superpower did present itself
in the form of satisfaction in America's humiliation. According to
Karl Kroeber, "many people around the world loathe us now: It
seems a fair guess that more than half the world's population
was not displeased to learn that on 11 September America
suffered a bit of what it had been dealing out for decades. . .
."[36] Jean Baudrillard puts it more blatantly: "That the entire

world without exception had dreamed of this event, that nobody
could help but dream of the destruction of so powerful a
Hegemon, this fact is unacceptable to the moral conscience of
the West. And yet it's a fact nevertheless, a fact that resists the
emotional violence of all the rhetoric conspiring to cover it up. In
the end, it was they who did it, but we who wished
it."http://www.ubishops.ca/baudrillardstudies/vol2_1/kellner.htm
- _edn6.[37]
Of course Baudrillard does not mean that the terrorist attacks
were justified or that America, being a superpower, should be
destroyed. What he means is that the West has unnaturally,
almost immorally, repressed the natural feeling that any
hegemony contains potentially the seeds of its own
destruction.[38] As he argues, the moral outrage ignited by the
9/11 footage was a compensation for people's clandestine
fascination by the uncanny event and their jubilation at having
seen absolute hegemony humiliated. By Western standards, it
was definitely immoral to feel exhilarated at such a view, but it
turns out to be also immensely unethical to stick to the idea of
the eternal invulnerability of the Absolute. On an aesthetic level,
the fascination felt refers mostly to a wish-fulfilling process
according to which what had so far been imagined or visualized
in the world of fantasy was actually seen, watched live by
millions in the real world, thus turning an ambiguous fantasy of
disaster into concrete examples of what such a fantasy would be
like.
Kant believes that the harmonization of concept and imagination
is bound up with the emergence of beautiful form as an
aesthetic phenomenon/object, the assessment of which should
be independent of any moral laws. From the point of view of
determinant judgment, to be fascinated by the event, and thus
acknowledge pure aesthetic powerfulness, is a crime and an
immoral act. Through aesthetic/reflective judgment, though, it is
not only to recognize, philosophically as well as politically, the
vulnerability of absolute power, which is an immensely ethical
act, but also to ponder over a spectacular and highly
unanticipated scene where a giant is momentarily brought to his
knees with a big thump.
7. Conclusion
Stockhausen is telling us that the leap out of security that
occurred during the 9/11 attacks is analogous to the smaller
safety-defying steps out of the ordinary taken by great art. Still,
if great art requires a small degree of insecurity, an aesthetic
appreciation of great art presupposes that we feel absolutely
safe. To witness representations of 9/11 on the TV is to have
the opportunity to safely appreciate aesthetically an
unprecedented event and reflect on the danger that something
similar or the same thing might have happened to oneself but
fortunately did not. When Stockhausen, Hirst and other artists
articulate their enthusiasm for the aesthetic (artistic?)
dimensions of the terrorist attacks, they do it from the privileged
position of sheer spectatorship. In other words, they feel free to
be engrossed by that unprecedented event since they were not
implicated in the horror either as victims or as perpetrators. I
have argued that their fascination can partly be attributed to the
recognition that, at times, reality is able to reconfigure itself as
the highest form of art and also open up new possibilities for

artistic creativity and vision. However, like all spectators in the
twenty-first century, they run the risk not of taking fiction for
reality so much as taking reality for fiction, the latter proving a
lot more dangerous.
In a world suffused with fictionality and virtual reality, the real is
frequently denied representation or even existence. One
becomes accustomed to viewing fictitious scenes of raw
violence; therefore a real incident would probably make no real
difference. Schiller, commenting on tragic theater's ability to
train spectators in handling staged pain and adjusting to harsh
reversals of fortune, argues that "the more often the mind
renews [this act of self-sufficiency], the more accomplished the
human spirit becomes and it acquires an ever greater advantage
over sensuous urges, such that when a serious misfortune finally
does arise in the midst of these imagined and artificial ones, that
person is in the position to treat it as an artificial one. . . ."[39]
Schiller's position entails the deliberate subjugation of an
individual to a beautiful fantasy, the fantasy that what one is
witnessing is not really happening, like the rest of the
misfortunes that one has witnessed through art.
The translation of a horrific event into a beautiful and
imaginative representation or fantasy is not unethical to the
extent that it blends artistic pleasure with the concern for real
pain and tribulation and with the concern for beauty and
aesthetic appreciation. What I have shown in this paper is that
in discussing terror(ism) it is necessary that we also resort to
aesthetics. An aesthetic assessment of history and political and
social issues by no means runs counter to a serious and
objective description or investigation of real life and human
experience. Far from it: aesthetic/reflective judgment, insofar as
it is morally disinterested yet ethically involved, could bypass
prejudice and avoid censorship, thus offering a just and more
sincere view of human activity and its representations.
Paradoxically, in the debate on terror, art and beauty assume an
even greater importance in the sense that they provide views
and sensations that are other than reason (they can hardly be
called reasonable in a conventional way), thereby helping
analyze events like 9/11 that cannot be analyzed through reason
only. After all, what better way to delve into unreasonable facts
but through alternative, non-reasonable, non-scientific
methods?
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